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Corbo and Fischer review the rationale for  negative extemal shocks. Successful stabilization
programs and then evaluate the design, imple-  and appropriate adjustment to extemal shocks
mentation, and effectiveness of Bank-supported  (including contingency financing) increase the
adjustment programs.  Among lessons they draw  implementation rate.
from this review of the programs are the follow-
ing:  * To be successful, an adjustment program
must be owned by the government. Extemal
. In countries experiencing acute macroeco-  financing alone won't  work. It is important to
nomic imbalances (high fiscal deficits, balance  diagnose the country's development problems
of payments crises, and high open or repressed  and to build a consensus around the adjustment
inflation), adjustment should start with policy  program.
and institutional reforms to deal with the ulti-
mate causes of the macroeconomic crisis.  Once  *  Political support for stabilization is more
progress has been made in reducing inflation and  likely when the government actively explains the
the fiscal and balance of payments deficits, other  source of the problems the program addresses,
structural reforms aimed at improving resource  how it plans to tackle them, why this is the best
allocation and achieving sustainable, equitable  option, and how people will benefit from the
growth should be tried (particularly refomn  of the  new policy environment.  Awareness of the
public sector, trade and domestic competition,  economic problems that motivate the decision
the financial sector, and the labor market).  for reform is strongest at the beginning - so
prompt implementation usually increases the
* The Bank can help adjustment by giving  chance of political support.
both policy advice and finance and by mobiliz-
ing other sources of finance.  *  Adjustment usually calls for reducing public
spending but it is imponant to strengthen public
* Adjustment lending has a positive effect on  institutions through improved policies, organiza-
growth, constant-price export rates, and saving  tion, and management.
rates, and a negative effect on the investment
ratio.  In the short run it does not appear to affect  * The ultimate success of adjustment depends
systematically changes in living conditions.  not only on getting the right policies in place but
on increasing investment - including efficient
* The implementation rate of programs  public investment, saving, and growth.  Public
increased in the 1980s, both for countries that  policy can contribute to these objectives by
received adjustment loans since the early 1980s  mobilizing savings and providing a macroeco-
and for those that started more recently. Imple-  nomic framework that supports investment and
mentation rates are lower for countries with  efficient growth.
higher rates of inflation or that suffered heavier
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The World Bank introduced Adjustment Lending in 1979 to assist member
countries to deal with the second oil shock by providing temporary balanc:e  of
pLyments financing while the necessary stabilization and structural adjustment
measures were expected to take effect. 1 Adjustment lending --  defined as
rapidly disbursing, policy-based lending2  --  3rew in importance after the
onset of the debt crisis in 1982, which both reduced the availability of
financing and brought growing recognition of the need for structural reforms
by many Bank member countries.  By the end of the 1980s adjustment lending
accounted for about 25 percent of total World Bank lending, and for well over
50 percent of lending to some heavily indebted countries.
The typical country initiating an adjustment program supported by the
Bank --  usually in its initial phases supported also by the International
Monetary Fund --  faces pressing macroeconomic problems that are manifested in
the form of a large fiscal deficit and an unsustainable balance of payments
deficit, and in many cases open or repressed inflation.  These problems
usually stemmed from a mixture of expansionary demand policies and large
external shocks to the real interest rate, commodity prices, the demand for
exports, and the availability of external financing.  Typically, political and
institutional  weaknesses limit the capacity of the country to respond to the
external shocks.
1  For the origins of adjustment lending, see Stern (1983).
2  Adjustment lending is sometimes also defined as balance of payments
support lending; since all capital inflows support the  balance of payments, the
emphasis is more accurately placed on the rapidly disbursing feature.2
Structural  adjustment  programs  seek  to achieve  both  macroeconomic
stabilization  and  structural  .ransformation  of the  economy  to address  the
longer-term  fundamental  causes  of the  country's  economic  crisis.
Stabilization  measures  to restore  macroeconomic  balance  focus  on bringing  the
level  of demand  and its  composition  (tradable  relative  to nontradable  goods)
in  line  with the  level  of output,  and  the  available  level  of external
financing. In  most cases  the  economy  requires  a reduction  in the  fiscal
deficit  and  the  realization  of a real  devaluation  to restore  internal  and
external  balance. The  longer-term  structural  reforms  focus  both on creating
more appropriate  incentives  --  by deregulating  domestic  goods  marke-s,
reforming  the  public  sector,  liberalizing  the  trade  regime,  removing
constraints  on factor  employment  and  mobility,  and  removing  obstacles  to
saving  and  investment,  and  on strengthening  institutional  elements  --
including  the  government's  capacity  to implement  policies  and  the framework
for  private  sector  development.
In countries  with acute  macroeconomic  problems,  structural  reforms  to
increase  efficiency  and  to restore  growth,  whose  efficiency  depends  on a
predictable  macroeconomic  situation,  should  be initiated  only  when sufficient
progress  has  been  made in reducing  the  macroeconomic  imbalances. However,  in
some  cases  substantial  reforms  in the  operation  of public  enterprises  and  the
financial  system  may  be needed  to achieve  stabilization. (Eastern  Europe  and
Chile 1973-75  are good  examples  here.) This  type  of structural  reform  is
undertaken  concurrently  with the  stabilization  program. The importance  of
this  sequence  of reforms  --  reforms  oriented  mainly  to reduce  severe
macroeconomic  imbalances  first  and to improve  resource  allocation  and  restore
growth  later  --  has  become  increasingly  clear  with experience. But  the3
.rgument als^ has strc.  analytical underpinnings: the benefits of structural
reforms that aim at improving resource allocation through changes in
incentives, generally transmitted through relative price changes, are reduced
by macroeconomic instability in the form of high and variable inflation and
balance of payments crises (Corbo and de Melo 1987; Fischer 1986; and Sachs
1987).
Reforms undertaken as part of a Bank-supported adjustment program add to
the country's indebtedness, and should not be attemDted unless there ic
sufficient probability that they will succeed.  While structural reforms to
improve resource allocation initiated before stabilization can turn out to be
productive, 3 the weight of the evidence suggests that reforms of this type
undertaken in highly unstabla macroeconomic conditions are typically
unsuccessful.  Reforms that start  with low credibility about their
sustainability may temporarily get current relative prices right, but
consumers and producers perceive that the reforms  will noc last and
intertemporal relative prices are accordingly distorted.  The result is that
the responses of consumers and producers can destabilize the whole reform
effort (Calvo 1989).  Country studies have also shown that many failures of
libeializatioLl  attempts have been due to the absence or failure of
accompanying stabilization efforts (Krueger, 1978 and 1984, Papageorgicu, et
al., 1990 and Corbo and de Melo, 1987).
The Bank periodically evaluates the effectiveness of the adjustment
prograns it  supports, as  well as their design and implementation. 4 It also
3  For instance, some of the reforms undertaken before stabilization in
Mexico appear to have been long-lasting.
4  Two recent comprehensive reviews are World Bank (1988a and 1990a).4
interacrs  with the research community and carries out a continuous research
program on different aspects of the economic development problems facing
developing c)untries.  From these evaluations, its interactions with the
research community, and the findings of its research program, tne Bank aerives
lessons for the design and implementat.on of programs.  This paper summarizes
some of those findings and lessons.
II. Stabilization Measures
Stabilization includes the restoration of external (current account) and
internal (unemployment) balance, as well as the control of inflation.  The
success rate of stabilization programs in countries that have experienced a
prolonged period of high inflation is very poor: countries typically uncertake
many attempts to stabilize, often showing temporary success, but longer-tern
success is elusive (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1988).  Short-term success can be
obtained by a temporary fiscal adjustment  with restrictive monetary policy
and/or fixing the exchange rate but longer-term success cannot be achieved
without long-lasting reductions in the broadly-definea p.  'c  sector deficit.
In some countries, incomes policies can also play an important supporting rc'e
in stabilizing expectations, braking inflationary momentum, and increasir.g  the
political support for stabilization programs (Bruno  and Piterman, 1988;
Dornbusch, 1989; Kiguel and Liviatan, 1990; and, Solimano 1990).  But incoMes
policies are useless, and may be counter-productive, if the country does not
undertake the necessary fiscal adjustments.
Fiscal adjustment not only removes the underlying cause of inflation,
but also helps to reduce absorption and thus decrease the non-interest current
account deficit towards a level that is compatible  with the sustainable level5
of external financing and interest payments on the external debt.  A real
devaluation that increases competitiveness is also a key component of the
restoration of external and internal balance.  If the reduction in absorption
is not accompanied by a real devaluation, then the demand for both tradable
and nontradable goods  will be reduced.  Lower demand for tradable goods
contributes directly to the reduction in the non-interest current account
deficit.  Lower demand for nontradable goods, without a real cevaluation, will
reduce the output of nontradable goods, and unemployment and excess capacity
will result (Corden 1981;  Dornbusch 1980).
Short-Term and Structural Reforms for Stibilization.
Rapid success in stabilization usually requires a mixture of cuts in
government spending (especially subsidies), reductions in public enterprise
losses, the tightening of credit, and tax  increases, undertaken in a given
institutional setting.  Frequently central bank losses, resulting from the
provision of credit subsidies to particular sectors and often through the
exchange rate system, are an important source of inflationary pressure, that
has to be closed immediately.
Structural reforms are needed to cement the stabilization as well as lay
the basis for the renewal of growth.  These include tax reforms, substitution
of QR's by tariffs, reduction in protection, public enterprise reforms and/or
privatization aimed at reducing the non-financial public sector deficit, and
changes  in the financial system and the central bank's role in it.  Generally
these reforms need to be phased in as institutions have to be put in place and
regulatory frameworks established (World  Bank, 1988a).  Institutional6
weaknessess and political factors sometimes make it  difficult to carry out
t'ese structural reforms.
Bank SupDort for Structural Reformns  in Support of Stabilization
The expectation when the World Bank begins to support an adjustment
program is that the country will undertake a phased program of structural
adjustments.  While a first structural adjustment  oan may mainly support
short-term s-abilization measures, also supported by the IMF, goverrment
actions envisaged under the terms cf the loan typically include the early
stages of some longer-term structural adjustments.  Subsequent loans, often in
the form of sectoral adjustment loans,  will focus more on structural
adjustment measures.  Among these  measures are tax reforms, the restructuring
of public expenditures, measures to increase the efficiency or to support the
privatization of state-owned enterprises, trade reforms, financial market
reforms, and other sectoral reforms.
Adjustment lending facilitates the phased reduction of the current
account.  By providing financing to help maintain the level of expenditure, it
potentially reduces the short run adjustment costs to output, e,oployment  and
consumption.  By providing sustained support over a period of time, the Bank
hopes to give the country time needed to undertake reforms with long
implementation periods.  It is of cour.  - possible that the availability of
additional financing merely postpones urgently needed reforms by reducing
immediate pressures on the government.  Loan conditionality is designed to
prevent this.  Analyses of adjustment lending have accordingly carefully
examined implementation rates of loan conditions.7
III.  Structural Reforms to Im rove Resource Allocaticn, Increase Growth and
Reduce Poverty
Once inflation has been reduced in a credible .ay, and progress has been
achieved in reducing the non-interest current account deficit, the potential
benefits of structural reforms aimed aL improving resource allocation and
achieving sustainable growth are increased.  for each country, economic
research and country-specific economic and sector  work is required to identify
the most important distortions that 1"inder  the  allocation of resources and
limit growth.  After the largest d,stortions have been identified, a central
question is the sequence and speed of reforms.  We discuss these two points in
order.
Sequencing of Reforms
In the presence of multiple distortions, the question of the optimal
sequence of teforms is a difficult one because policy is working in a world of
second (or higher) best.  In such a situation, the  welfare benefits of reforms
are case specific and depend on initial conditions and interrelations across
markets (Edwards, 1989; and the papers in Choksi and Papageorgieu, 1936).
Despite the popularity of the concept of sequencing, the notion  is  to
some extent misleading. 5 Some reforms should be undertaken in simultaneous
packages, rather than in strict sequence.  Further, it is necessary to
distinguish between the time at which decicions on reforms are taken, and the
time at which they are implemented.
5  This argument is developed in the context of socialist economy reform by
Fischer and Gelb (1990).8
However, some general recommendations on the sequencing of reforms have
emerged.  First, reforms should start  with large reductions in big
distortions.  Second, in economies with restrictive trade regimes, widespread
price controls, and restrictive domestic competitive practices, goods market
reforms should precede asset market reforms.  In particular, the
liberalization of the current account shculd precede the liberalization of the.-
capital account.  This recommendation is tased on two arguments.  First, the
speed of adjustment in asset markets is much faster than in commodity markets
and, therefore, to avoid large movements in capital flows and the real
exchange rate, capital controls should limit capital flows to the rate at
which goods markets adjust to domestic deregulatior.  and foreign trade
liberalization (Frenkel, 1982 and 1983).  Second, because asset prices are
determined by the expected present value of future income streams, distortiuns
in good's  and factor prices result in assets being traded at distorted prices;
the consequence is a misallocation of investment.  The potential gains from
deregulation of goods markets can also be severely cuitailed in countries
where there are major impediments to labor mobility and domestic financial
markets are almost non-existe  .t.  For such economies, reforms in the labor
market and the development of a domestic financial  market should accompany the
goods markets reforms.
Speed of Reform
Politicians and some economists are attracted to the gradual
implementatian cf stabilization and adjustment measures.  The attraction for
politicians lies in the possibility of avoiding painful measures and reducing
opposition; for economists, gradual smooth adjustments appear likely to reduce
the overall costs of adjustment.  For instance, in considering tariff reform,9
the politicians will see a phased reduction in tariffs as a way cf reducing
the intensity of opposition from powerful domestic producer interests;
economists argue that domestic producers who might in the short run be driven
out of business by foreign competition can become internationally competitive
given temporary but inexorably declining protection.
Gradual stabilization is unlikely to be a real option when inflation is
very high and the balance of payments deficit unsustainable.  Gradual
reductions of inflation have rarely been -chieved from inflation rates in
excess of IOC percent per annum, possibly because several forces tend to push
inflation higher in those coonditions. Further, a severe credibility problem
faces a government that promises a gradual reduction of fiscal imbalances over
time, but does not implement much change at the beginning.  If, as is
typically the case, the country also faces a balance of payments crisis, a
comprehensive and immediate stabilization package may be the only realistic
and credible stabilization option.
Structural adjustment measures that require the development of
institutions and appropriate human capital (e.g. financial reforms, tax
reform) have to be introduced more gradually, if only becasuse  they take time
to plan and implement.  General economic arguments suggest that, where
possible, as in the case of tariffs, distortions be removed quickly, to e.able
resource reallocations to take place at the right prices sooner rather than
later (Mussa, 1982; Edwards, 1989).  However, given market imperfections,
including the possibility of bankruptcy, rapid changes in relative prices can
increase adjustment costs.
Calculation of the right speed at which to introduce changes in relative
prices thus requires a balancing of the greater credibility of rapid reforms10
against the likelihood that rapid changes increase adjustment costs.6
Adjustment lending can help mitigate adjustment costs, and thereby sustain an
adjustment effort; in addition, the conditionality in adjustment lending can
increase the credibility of an adjustment program.
We conclude that while rapid stabilization is usually essential, the
appropriate timing of longer-term structural reforms depends on
country-specific political economy and economic conditions.  Depending on
country circumstances, the gradual introduction of structural reforms may be
preferable to an attempt to remove all major distortions extremely rapidly
(Michaely, 1987).
Sectoral Reforms
W;e  examine four areas of sectoral reform in detail:  public sector
reforms, trade/domestic  competition reforms, financial sector reforms, and
labor market reforms.  Although most reform efforts have been centered in
these four areas, labor market reforms have, for political reasons, been very
difficult to carry out.
1.  Public Sector Reforms
Public sector reform is at the center of macroeconomic and resource
allocation problems in many countries in need of adjustment.  It is
accordingly not surprising that public sector reforms are central components
of most adjustment programs.  Public sector reforms include macroeconomic
refotms aimed at reducing public sector deficits and microeconomic reforms
aimed at increasing the efficiency of public sector policies.  Fiscal reforms
to improve revenue collection, and to reduce the level and enhance the
6  Webb and Shariff  (1990) also discuss some of  the political  economy
aspects that affect the speed of reforms.II
efficiency of public expenditures, and actions to reduce the losses of public
enterprises are the typical actions included in macroeconomic reforms of the
public sector.  Microeconomic reforms include the reshaping of institutions,
restructuring of public enterprises and/or privatization.  In many countries
public sector reforms also include improvements in the capacity of the public
sector to provide basic primary health and education services.
2.  Trade/Domestic Competition Reform
Small countries with very distorted trade regimes and non-competitive
goods markets should over time obtain large benefits from reducing
non-competitive practices and liberalizing trade.  Although familiar, the
arguments against distorted trade regimes bear repetition: they generate
resource misallocation within import competing sectors, tend to repress
exports, and contribute to socially unproductive rent seeking activities, and
by reducing competitive pressures also tend to slow technical progress.
Structural reforms in the trade area aim at reducing the average level anrd
variance of tariff rates with the ultimate objective of moving towards a ,.ore
uniform tariff structure.  As a practical rule, incentives should not
discriminate against export-oriented activities and should promote the
development of broadly uniform across-the-board effective incentives fcr
import competing activities (Little,  Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; Corden, :974;
Balassa, 1976; Thomas et. al., 1990).
On the basis of this analysis, the Bank has supported trade reform as a
central element of adjustment programs, in both structural and sectoral
adjustment loans (Thomas,  et. al., 1990).  Bank-supported trade reforms have
been phased in gradually.12
Trade policy reform recommendations are derived from the standard theory
of commercial policy and from the empirical work on commercial policy referred
to above.  It could be claimed that new developments in trade theory call into
question these recommendations and provide a new foundation for differentiated
tariffs and, in a more general sense, for an active industrial policy.  The
new trade theory holds that international markets are typically imperfectly
competitive, and that trade is, to a considerable degree, driven by economies
of scale rather than comparative advantage (Helpman and Krugman 1985).  A
policy implication of this theory is that government should favor industries
that generate externalities.
The policy recommendations that seem to follow from the new trade theory
--  and that are buttressed by the view that  well-designed government
interventions enhanced growth in East Asian countries --  have met substantial
criticism on both economic and political economy grounds.  On the economic
side, the policy recommendations tend not to be robust to changes in  model
specification.  On the political economy side, it has been argued that the
work on rent-seeking and tariff formation clearly indicate that actual tariff
structures are driven more by the pressures of interest groups than by
efficiency considerations.
On the basis of such considerations, Krugman (1987, p.143) concludes
that "the gains from intervention are limited by uncertainty about the
appropriate policies..., by the general equilibrium effects that insure that
promoting one sector diverts resources from others.  ... Once the expected
gains from intervention have been whittled down sufficiently, political
economy (factors] can be invoked as a reason to forego intervention
altogether.  Free trade can serve as a simple principle with which to resist13
pressures of special-interest politics."  Helpman (1989,  p.21 3), while
showing that the new theories have had several empirical successes in
explaining trade phenomena, similarly concludes that "free trade remains a
good rule of thumb".  (See also Corden, 1990; Helpman and Krugman, 1989;
Krugman, 1990 and Srinivasan, 1989).
3.  Financial Sector Reforms
Financial sector reforms aim to improve the efficiency of intermediation
and the use of resources, including the allocation of investment.  The reforms
attempt to reduce distortions in credit allocations, typically in part through
the removal of controls oh  interest rates, with the intention of allowing them
to become market determined.  In addition, appropriate information and
prudential supervision systems need to be put in place.
Initial conditions play a central role in the design and implementation
of financial reforms.  If a large proportion of the assets of financial
institutions are held at below market rates or are non-performing, then
financial reform will create difficulties for existing institutions.  In
particular if deposit and lending rates are deregulated simultaneously and
free entry into the financial system is allowed, existing banks will be forced
to pay market intetest rates.  They will suffer substantial losses,
jeopardizing the banking system's solvency and macroecc;;omic  stability.  It
may be necessary in such cases to allow for a transition phase, in which
lending rates are deregulated first,  with deposit rates following only
gradually (World Bank, 1989).  In other cases, most banks may be insolvent
before the financial reforms are implemented.  The banks then have to be
recapitalized, thereby creating a potential fiscal problem.  In countries
where domestic financial systems are practically non-existent, the creation of14
a financial system to provide at the minimum financing for working capital
should be a high priority, though not one that can be realized very rapidly.
This point could be especially relevant for Eastern Europe (Calvo and
Coricelli, 1990).
Financial sector reforms are amono the most difficult to undertake,
because the running of such institutions requires a great deal of specific
business knowledge and experience.  They are also difficult to evaluate, in
particular because recapitalized institutions can run for some time  without
problems becoming evident.
4.  Labor Market Reforms
Labor market regulations and institutions may play a key role in the
efficiency and ultimate success ot a structural adjustment problem.  In
countries that require a large real devaluation to accompany absorption
reduction policies, obtaining an initial decline in real wages could  make a
major difference between a large recession with massive unemployment (Chile,
1982) or macroeconomic adjustment without a major change in unemployment
(Mexico, 1983-89).  Labor legislation or convention, in the form of rigid wage
indexation rules, is often a major impediment to successful macroeconomic
adjustment and the ultimate success of structural reforms aimed at improving
resource allocation in goods markets.
Success could also be hindered by rigid labor practices that restrict
labor mobility.  Large severance payments, lack of flexibility in the real
wage structure, the attachment to employment of substantial non-wage benefits,
such as housing, utilities and education, and other institutional rigidities
to labor mobility are typical impediments to successful adjustment.  They need15
to be addressed early in structural adjustmelit  programs, but are in practice
very difficult for a government to tackle.
Promoting economic growth
Structural reforms that contribute to the reduction of macroeconomic
imbalances and the improvement of resource allocation create the foundations
for a recovery of growth (Fischer, 1987).  Sustained growth generally has four-
main requirements: stable macroeconomic conditions, an appropriate incentive
and resource allocation system, an adequate level of saving, and efficient
institutions to turn saving into productive physical and human investment.  We
have already discussed some necessary elements in achieving the first two
requirements.
Since most indebted countries are likely to be making net transfers
abroad rather than receiving net foreign resources, they  will need to make a
major effort to increase national saving.  The weight of the empirical
evidence suggests that private saving rates are not very sensitive to po4  c4es
and, in particular, to interest rates (Giovannini, 1985; Schmidt-Hebbel, e-
al., 1990).  However, negative real interest rates probably discourage saving
--  certainly they reduce the efficiency of financial intermediation --  and
encourage capital flight.  Private saving rates are very sensitive to the
economic cycle as a result of consumption smoothing.  If there are no leaka_es
through lower private saving, public saving can contribute to an increase in
national saving.  Empirical evidence presented in Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1990) shows that public saving can make a major contribution to an increase
in national saving (see  also Summers, 1985).  The evidence on saving again
highlights the central importance of fiscal balance.16
The last factor, an increase in the rate and efficiency of private
investment, is much affected by a stable macroeconomic framework and clear and
predictable tax rules and property rights (Rodrik, 1989; Serven and Solimano,
1990a and 1990b).
The belief that economic policy and the investment rate are major
determinants of economic growth has long been expressed in the writings of
economists.  However it  is only very recently that  models have been able to
capture the links among policy, investment and long-term growth.  The new
endogenous growth literature, pioneered by Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas
(1988),  has created a class of theoretical  models in which economic policy can
affect investment, human capital accumulation, technological innovation and
resource allocation in  ways that alter long-run, steady-state growth rates.
The ideas underlying these models --  economies of scale, externalities,
and public goods --  and the argument that the removal of distortions promote
growth have been familiar for a long time, and form the foundation for over
three decades of World Bank programs.  At a minimum, the new models provide a
framework that may improve understanding of growth-promoting policies that
have been suggested and implemented in the past (Easterly and Wetzel, 1989);
possibly th.ey  will also improve the quality of growth-promoting policies in
the future.
This  iterature highlights a number of channels through  which public
policies c,-.  affect growth.  Recent World Bank papers by Arrau (1989), Romer
(1989), and Rebelo (1990) show that promoting human capital accumulation, for
example by providing adequate nutritional levels and basic educational skills,
and invest.ent in Research and Development, can foster growth.  Along these
lines, Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1988) show that economies  may become stuck17
in a poverty trap: a situation  where low income and low human capital levels
create incentives for high population growth and low i ¢-tment  in human
capital that perpetuate the state of poverty.  Policies that stimulate
investment in human capital can break the economy out of this stagnant
situation.
The new models also stress the importance of trade policy, fiscal
policy, and financial policy, confirming earlier empirical work.  The World
Bank has been at the forefront of empirical studies of trade policy and
growth.  Along with large multicountry case studies, recent work by Feder
(1983), Balassa (1985), Easterly and Wetzel (1989), de Melo and Robinson
(1989), Nishimizu and Page (1990),  Dollar (1990), and Levine and Renelt (1990)
have carefully examined the cross-country evidence on trade policy and
growth.  The result of this empirical work indicates that, after adjusting for
factor accumulation, countries with more open economies have had higher rates
of growth.
Governments are capable of policies that enhance growth and also of
policies that hinder growth.  In Easterly (1990) and Barro (1990), governments
may have positive growth effects by providing essential public goods; they may
have negative growth effects by wasting funds sn worthless projects and
bloated bureaucracies, or by imposing taxes and regulations that distort
saving and investment decisions.  It is thus necessary to conduct a detailed
study of the composition of government expenditures and the structure of taxes
to evaluate the effects of any country's fiscal stance on growth.  These
studies find a negative effect cf higher government consumption on growth.
However, the complexity of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth
is borne out by recent empirical work in Levine and menelt (1990).  They find18
that broad macroeconomic indicators of fiscal policy are not robustly related
to growth in a ctoss-section of countries.
The role of financial policy in growth has also been the focus of World
Bank scrutiny.  Gelb (1989) and Easterly and Wetzel (1989) present preliminary
evidence suggesting that, after controlling for factor accumulation, financial
deregulat:on from severely distorted initial positions has a positive eff~tct
on growth.
Alleviation of poverty
The ultimate objective of Bank lending is to contribute to economic
development and the eradication of poverty.  Indeed, the reduction of poverty
is the central objective of most Bank country assistance.  The strategy to
reduce poverty enunciated in the 1990  World Development Report has two
components: first, to encourage broad-based economic growth and in this  way to
promote the use of the poor's most abundant asset --  labor; second, to improve
the provision of social services to the poor --  especially primary education,
social infrastructu  ^  and basic health care (World Bank, 1990b).  The second
component is desirable not only for its own sake, but also because it enhances
the productivity of the poor.  In addition the World Development Report
recommends the adoption of targetted interventions to repch those, such as the
old and those living in especially poor regions,  who are not helped by the
basic two-part strategy.
Adjustment from an unsustainable economic situation, following policy
mismanagement or adverse external shocks, often has significant short run
social costs.  The poor, who already have low  welfare levels, may find it  very
difficult to absorb short-term losses.  Therefore, adjustment programs also
include an assessment of the short-term effects of policies on the poor as19
well as specific measures to protezt the pocr during the transition (Maasland
and Van der Gaag, 1990).7
Atce..tion  to the impact of adjustment on the poor is not only desirable
in its ow-n  right, but also helps assure the sustainability of adjustment
programs.  While as a logical matter, the costs of adjustment should be
calculated by comparing economic performance under adjustment wit.+  the likely
outcome of non-adjustment, political perceptions evaluate adjustment policies
by comparing the (typically unsustainable) pre-adjustment situation with the
conditions following implementation of adjustment policies.
Why is World Bank Support Needed?
If reforms are as favorable as the World Bank claims, why do countries
require financial support from the Bank to undertake them?  The answer is
that even very beneficial reforms may have important transitional adjustment
(and  distribution) costs that could make their implementation difficult.
Balance of payments support could make an important contribution to the
sustainability and ultimate success of the reforms by reducing the need to cut
expenditures and imports  while the reforms are being implemented.  As
countries are restricted from borrowing in international capital markets, Bank
lending, conditional on the implementation of a program, helps sustain
expenditures while the reforms are being implemented.  We discuss now the
rationale for balance of payments support for the different types of r.?fcrm
discussed above.
In the case of public sector reforms, quick disbursing balance of
payment support could contribute to temporary financing of the budget deficit,
7  Attention to the impacts of adjustment measures on the poor increased
during the  1980s as it became  clear that adjustment would  not be  effected
quickly.20
while structural reforms of the revenue system and of government expenditures
are  put in place.  Since large budget deficits typically underlie current
account deficits, these fiscal reforms usually also make a direct contribution
to a sustainable reduction in the curren; account deficit.
In the case of trade reforms, balance of payment support could make an
important contribution to the financing of a transitory increase in imports
while the reforms take time to result in increased exports.  Since people
expect this difference in response times, the availability of financing could
contribute also to the credibility and sustainability of the reforms.
External financing can also help bridge some of the short-term adjustment
costs incurred in industries that need to restructure or to disappear
altogether.  Similarly, reductions of distortions in goods markets that are
likely to be beneficial in the long run can result in temporary unemployment
of resources.  The costs of this unemployment can be reduced through
adjustment lending.
In the case of financial sector reforms, balance of payments support
could contribute to financing transitory increases in government expenditures
resulting from recapitalization of banks and the reduction in taxation of
financial intermediaries.
In each case, the World Bank's financial support for adjustment programs
can cushion some of the short-term adjustment costs of refonns and in this  way
contribute to their sustainability and ultimate success.  Furthermore, to the
extent that the Bank brings its expertise to bear, its lending helps member
countries to design and implement more effective programs and, in this way, to
adjust more successfully.21
For the B.ank  itself, successful adjustment programs help restore a
country's growth and improve its creditworthiness.  Furthermore, the benefits
of project lending are severely curtailed in highly distorted economies, and
adjustment lending can therefore contribute to the success of project
lending.  Indeed, with distorted incentives, increased investment financing
may inciease capital accumulation in the "wrong" activities, exacerbating the
misallocation of resources.  In the extreme, taking into account the need to
service the debt, it  could even result in immiserizing investment.
IV.  Main Conclusions of the First and Second Report on Adjustment Lending
The First and Second Reports on Adjustment Lending are two recen:
comprehensive efforts at evaluating Bank experience with adjustment programs
(World Bank 1988a and 1990a).  We summarize below the main conclusions of
these reports.
The main conclusions of the first report were:
Success in Improving Performance.  Adjustment lending  was moderately
successful in improving aggregate economic performance.  Despite suffering
more serious shocks, the 30 countries that received adjustment loans before
1985 performed better (increased growth more) on average thar,  the 63 that did
not.  The performance was even better in the 12 countries with three or more
adjustment loans before 1987 and in countries that were substantial exporters
of manufactured goods.  Adjustment lending appeared to have been relatively
less successful in the highly indebted countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Detailed  country  studies corroborated the statistical findings.  The report
cautioned,  however,  that  the conclusions  were tentative, because it  was22
dif'icult to isolate the effects of adjustment lending from the effects of
initial conditiotis  and external shocks.
Implementation of Conditions.  The overall rate of implwmentation of
conditions  was good, and conditions were more likely to be implemented  when
the loan agreement -pelled  them out precisely.  In a sample of about 50
adjustment loans to 15 countries, 60 percent of the conditions were met fully  -
during the loan period, arn.  another 24 percent were substantially fulfilled.
Adequacy of External  Financing.  Although the sudden cutoff of external
financing made some type of adjustment essential, orderly and sustained
adjustment required adequate external financing.  In some countries
unanticipated underfunding of the program reduced or delayed the benefits.  In
other instances, however, external adjustment assistance simply delayed the
implementation of adjustment measures.
Commitment to the Reform Program.  The governments that best sustained their
commitment to reforms were those that "owned" the program from the start.
Although irternational agencies often assisted in prepaving the program-s,  the
governments had to be convinced that the operations were the most appropriate
way to address the problems facing their countries.
The Main Conclusions of the Second Report were:
Aggregate Effects of Structural Reforms.  Countries adopting adjustment
programs have on average grown faster than other countries.  After adjusting
for the effects of initial conditions, external shocks, and the amount of
external financing, the countries that entered full-fledged adjustment
programs (EIAL, or Early Intensive Adjustment Lending countries) had a larger
increase in the average rate of GDP growth than other ccuntries.  For some of
these countries --  such as Nigeria, the Philippines, Malawi, Cote d'lvoire,23
and Mexico --  growth was slower than country characteristics  would have
predicted.  In other countries  --  such as Korea, Mauritius, Morocco, Ghana,
and Thailand --  programs supported by the Bank appear to have stimulated
growth by more than the initial conditions, external shocks, and external
financing  would have suggested.  Constant-price exports as a share of
constant-price GDP has increased substantially in the EIAL countries, both
before and after adjusting for other factors.
Adjusting for these same factors, investment fell on average as a  hare
of GDP in the EIAL countries.  This means, however, that the relative
efficiency of investment 4n  EIAL countries rose, because they achieved higher
growth with less investment.  Both public and private investment declined.
Often a decline in public investment was desirable, since its level was
unsustainable and some of it had been misdirected.  But for countries that
have made major progress in reducing macroeconomic imbalances and reducing
distortions and institutional weaknesses, resuming public investment in
infrastructure is important for stimulati  ,  private investment and for
restoring growth.  The reduction of private investment in the initial years of
an adjustment program was predictable, because incentives  were being changed
and the credibility of the program was building.  The counterpart of the
temporary decline in the investment ratio is that adjusting countries were
able to have higher private consumption than otherwise.  This should help
sustain the reforms.
Need for a Supportive Macroeconomic Environment.  A stable macroeconomic
framework contributes to the success of structural adjustment in every major
area of the economy.  Adjustment programs were more likely to fail when a
stable macroeconomic framework was not in place, even when the adjustment24
package focused  mainly on microeconomic and sectoral policies.  So, in a
country that starts with high inflation and a large current account deficit,
the structural adjustment program should focus in4-ially on measures to reduce
inflation and the current account deficit.  The macroeconomic situation will
be supportive of the adjustment program when the inflation rate is reasonably
low and predictable, real interest rates are appropriate, the real exchange
rate is competitive and predictable, public sector saving rates are compatible
with the resource mobilization requirements of the program, and the balance of
payments situation is perceived as viable.
Effect of Adjustment on Poverty and Living Conditions.  Some short-run social
costs are inevitable when an economy has to adjust to adverse external shocks
or the effects of previous policy mismanagement.  When some of the poor are
among the losers from adjustment, they suffer greatly since they were already
at a subsistence level.  Although the situation of the poor during adjustment
offers no cause for complacency, the Report did not find evidence that
adjustment lending  was associated with an increase in the overall misery of
the poor.  On the contrary, orderly adjustment, supported by Bank lending,
seems to be less costly for most of the poor and for the general populace than
disorderly adjustment without Bank support.
Changes in the available socioeconomic indicators of living conditions
do not appear to be systematically related to adjustment lending.  The rate of
growth of private consumption in EIAL countries in 1985-86 increased in total
and on a per capita basis, in comparison  with other country categories and
when controlling fcr other factors.  Current consumption appears to have been
protected --  relative to other countries --  by a reduction in investment
expenditures.  Other short-run indicators, such as nutrition and immunization,25
have also improved for the EIAL countries.  Long-run indicators of living
conditions, such as infant and child mortality, have continued to improve in
most countries, with or without adjustment lending.  However, the poor quality
and the aggregate nature of the data do not point to unqualified conclusions
on these issues.
While socioeconomic indicators show continued improvement, the share of
central government expenditure on the social sector has fallen slightly on
average in countries with adjustment lending.  Per capita social expenditures
by the central governments have also declined in some adjusting countries.  It
is possible that some of the impact of declines in health and education
expenditures on lower income groups were offset by increased contributions
from local governments and by better targeting of government spending.  The
declines in education expenditure have been accompanied by falling primary
school enrollment ratios for the EIAL countries.  To prevent declines in
socioeconomic indicators, most adjusting countries need to increase social
sector expenditures targeted toward the poor.
Since adjustment is taking longer in most countries than originally
expected, recent adjustment operations supported by the Bank include more
detailed analyses of the social impacts of adjustment programs and more
measures to alleviate the short-run costs of adjustment to the newly
unemployed and the poor.  Such measures include reallocaticns of social
expenditures toward services used by the poor, severance payments and
retraining for newly unemployed workers, and public works and employment
schemes for unskilled workers.  In some cases, several targeted interventions
have been assembled into  multi-sector compensatory programs.26
Raising  Efficiency.  Increases in the efficiency of  investment can reduce the
need for more sating.  Distortionary policies, such as trade restrictions and
financial repression, hold down the efficiency of investment and thus the rate
of growth for a given investment level.  Removing these distortionary policies
does the reverse: it increases the efficiency of investment and the growth
rate of GDP for a given level of investment.  Furthermore, analysis indicates
that reform efforts must reach a critical mass to be effective: small
decreases in extremely high distortions do not have much effect on growth.  To
have significant payoffs, reform programs usually must focus on large
reductions in the large distortions.
Increasing Investment.  To sustain adjustment and restore growth, countries
must not only reduce distortions, they must also create the conditions for an
eventual increase in investment.  Some countries, especially in Africa, need
more domestic saving and external financing to reach investment levels
consistent with the restoration of growth.  But in many countries, the
prevalence of  capital flight indicates that stagnant investment results from
inadequate demand for investment rather than from the unavailability cf
saving.  In  highly indebted countries, the debt overhang often creates
uncertainties  a'-out  the  sustainability  of  the balance of payments  S
and  about  macroeconomic stability, and thus may thwart the recovery of private
investment.  Debt and debt-service reductions in the context of adjustment
programns  can help reduce these uncertainties.
The eventual recovery of investment requires an appropriate ana credible
economic environment.  Investment does not respond well when investors,
foreign and domestic, doubt that the government will sustain its reforms and
when legal and bureaucratic impediments are left untouched.  Private investors27
often wait before making irreversible ir.vestment  decisions, keeping their
assets elsewhere.  Providing appropriate public investments that complement
private investment, and persuading some private investors to commit
themselves, usually helps to overcome the doubts of the majority.  Bu. there
is no simple way to bring this about.  The obvious remedy of specific
investment subsidies is likely to be expensive and at odds with the objectives.-
of leaving decisions to market forces and restoring fiscal balance. An
appropriate strategy for increasing investment contains four elements:
- Establishing and maintaining macroeconomic stability, including a
predictable and competitive real exchange rate, a small budget deficit,
and low rates of m:onetary  growth and inflation.
- Removing legal and bureaucratic impediments to investment by domestic
and foreign firms, and providing clear rules for taxation, property
rights, and the regulation of production and trade.
- Expanding public investment that is complementary to private irnvestment.
- Ensuring sufficient external financing to support a sound program in
both the medium and the long terms.  In highly indebted middle-inccme
countries committed to sustaining a reform effort, the Brady initiat4ve
and other debt-reduction schemes should help improve the viability a-;d
credibility of adjustment programs.
Raising Saving Rates.  To sustain desirable rates of investment and growth,
the saving rates in  most adjusting countries have to increase, especially in
many African countries  which started the 1980s  with very low saving rates.
The most effective way to increase saving in the initial years of an
adjustment program is to increase public saving.  Private saving, responsive
mainly to an increase in the GDP growth rate, starts to increase after growth28
gets under way.  Once real interest rates are positive, further increases of
real interest rates on deposits and special tax treatments for savings are
unlikely to cause any large increase in saving rates.
Refinements.  The findings of the second report confirm and extend some of the
conclusions of the first report.  The sequencing and packaging of reform
measures is crucial.  In countries that start with high inflation and a large
current account deficit, the first step is to implement stabilization
measures.  Structural reforms aimed at maintaining  macroeconomic balance
should be emphasized next.  Sectoral reforms should be sequenced in a way that
takes account of the linkages among sectors.  For instance, trade
liberalization is likely to improve efficiency more if accompanied by measures
that improve the functioning of domestic markets for goods and credit, provide
needed infrastructure, and reduce controls on domestic investment and
impediments to labor mobility.  In some low-income countries, barriers to the
integration of the domestic economy --  poor roads, inappropriate domestic
transport infrastructure, lack of domestic financial markets, and so on --  are
major impediments to economic growth,  which should be tackled early.
The data set on conditionality and implementation, with a much expanded
sample of loans approved in FY79-88, showed most of the same patterns found in
the first Report, and revealed some new ones.  Countries begin implementing
their structural adjustment program before the adjustment loans become
effective and frequently continue implementation after disbursement ends.
Progress in implementation is measured by the share of conditions in the loan
agreements that have been implemented by the time of final tranche release.
Of all conditions  in the loan agreements in the sample, 84 percent had been
implemented at least substantially --  better than found in the first Report --29
and 66 percent had been implemented fully or more than fully by the time of
final tranche release.
Implementation rates increased during the 1980s, both for countries that
had received adjustment loans since the early 1980s and for countries that
started more recently.  For the loans in the sample that had final tranche
release in FY89, i.e., since the first Report, 99 percent of the conditions
were implemented at least substantially, and 80 percent of the conditions as
originally written were implemented fully or more.  In the rare cases when a
condition as originally written does not seem necessary, the Bank waives the
condition, with approval from the Board.  Not counting the one loan in the
sample for which this occurred in FY89, would raise the proportion of fully
implemented conditions from 80 to 88 percent.  Essentially, the final tranches
were released only when all conditions in the loans were at least
substantially fulfilled.
The second report also examines political economy factors in the
implementation of adjustment programs.  Governments have more frequently been
able to develop and maintain political support for structural adjustment when
the program was designed with the need for political support in mind, and when
the government  was active in explaining the source of the problems addressed
by the program, how it planned to tackle them,  why this was the best option
and how people would benefit from the new policy environment.  Mobilizing
beneficiaries to become political supporters usually follows.  While technical
considerations sometimes cause unavoidable delays in program implementation,
more prompt implementation almost always increases the chances of political
support.  Awareness of the economic problems that  motivated the initial
decision for reform will be strongest at the beginning, giving the authorities30
maximum latitude for reform.  The support for sustaining the new status quo
then develops as structural reform pays off in growth and higher living
standards.
A final conclusion of the two Reports is that adjustment programs need
to give greater attention to reforming and developing institutions in several
areas: the agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa; the financial sector and.-
fiscal management in many countries; and public enterprises in almost all
countries.  Although adjustment programs often call for a reduction of
resources going into the public sector, it is equally important to strengthen
public institutions through improved policies, organization, and management.
Institutional development is essential for both the implementation and the
ultimate success of many of the reforms the Bank supports.
V.  Concluding Remarks
The design and implementation of adjustment programs is not an easy
task.  Nor is it a task that can be carried out successfully unless each
program is tailored to the specific circumstances of the adjusting country.
However, some lessons that have found their way into Bank-supported programs
have emerged from the analysis of adjustment problems and programs.
In countries that are experiencing acutp marrceconomic imbalances
manifested in the form of high fiscal deficits, balance of payments crisis and
high open or repressed inflation, adjustment should start  with policy and
institutional reforms to deal with the ultimate causes of the macroeconomic
crisis.  Once enough progress has been achieved in reducing inflation and the
fiscal and balance of payments deficits, other structural reforms aimed at
improving resource allocation and achieving sustainable and equitable growth
should be attempted.  Among the latter reforms the  most common are:  public31
sector reforms, trade/domestic competition reforms and financial sector
reforms.  Labor market reforms, although attempts in  many cases, are rnot  as
common as they should be.
The Bank can assist the adJustment process by providing both finance and
policy advice.  Furthermore, the Bank helps countries in mobilizing other
sources of finance.  What impact has Bank adjustment lending had cn borrowing
countries?  It was found in RAL-2 that, adjusting for non-program factors,
adjustment lending has had a positive effect on growth, and on the constant
price export and investment rates.  However, it has had a negative effect on
the investment ratio.
With respect to the effects of adjustment lending on social indicators,
the available evidence shows that changes in living conditions in the short
run do not appear to be systematically related to the presence or not of
adjustment lending.
The implementation rate of programs increased during the 1980s, both for
countries that had received adjustment loans since the early 1980s and for
countries that started more recently.  However, implementation rates are lower
for countries with higher rates of inflation and for countries that suffered
higher negative external shocks.  Successful stabilization and appropriate
adjustment to external shocks (including  contingency financing) help to
increase the implementation rate of programs.
Both  RAL-1 and RAL-2 underline the importance of a good diagnosis of  t?.e
development problems facing a country, and of the need to build a consensus
around the adjustment program.  External financing can help the implementation
of a government ow-ned  program, but it will not be effective if the government
is not convinced of the need for adjustment.  To be successful, a program has
to be owned by the government.32
Governments have been more frequently able to develop and maintain
political support for structural adjustment  when the program was designed with
this aim in mind and when the government  was active in explaining the source
of the problems addressed by the program, how it planned to tackle them,  why
this was the best option, and how people would benefit from the new policy
environment.  Mobilizing beneficiaries to become political supporters usually
follows.  While technical considerations sometimes cause unavoidable delays in
program implementation, more prompt implementation almost always increases the
chances of political support.  Awareness of the economic problems that
motivated the initial decision for reform will be strongest at the beginning,
giving the authorities maximum latitude for reform.  The support for
sustaining the new status quo then develops as structural reform pays off in
growth and higher living standards.
Although adjustment programs often call for a net reduction of resources
going into the public sector, it is equally important to strengthen public
institutions through improved policies, organization, and management.
Institutional development is essential for both the implementation and the
ultimate success of many of the reforms the Bank supports.
The ultimate success of the adjustment programs depends not only on
getting the right policies in place but also on increasing investment --
including efficient public investment, saving and growth.  Public policy has
much to contribute to these objectives by mobilizing saving and providing a
macroeconomic framework in support of investment and efficient growth.33
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